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We investigate quantum secret sharing schemes constructed from [[n, k, δ]]D non-binary stabilizer
quantum error correcting codes with carrier qudits of prime dimension D. We provide a systematic
way of determining the access structure, which completely determines the forbidden and intermediate
structures. We then show that the information available to the intermediate structure can be fully
described and quantified by what we call the information group, a subgroup of the Pauli group
of k qudits, and employ this group structure to construct a method for hiding the information
from the intermediate structure via twirling of the information group and sharing of classical bits
between the dealer and the players. Our scheme allows the transformation of a ramp (intermediate)
quantum secret sharing scheme into a semi-quantum perfect secret sharing scheme with the same
access structure as the ramp one but without any intermediate subsets, and is optimal in the amount
of classical bits the dealer has to distribute.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Pp, 03.67.Mn
I. INTRODUCTION
Classical secret sharing, introduced first by [1] and [2],
is an important multipartite cryptographic protocol in
which a dealer distributes a secret to a set of partici-
pants (players) in such a way that only certain subsets of
players that form the access structure can collaboratively
recover it. Quantum secret sharing [3–5] is the natural
extension of the classical protocol to the quantum do-
main: the secret is now a quantum state, the players
comprise of quantum systems and quantum communica-
tion is allowed between the dealer and the players. The
(q, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme is one of
the most common protocols, in which the access structure
comprises all subsets of q or more out of n players, and
the forbidden structure consists of all subsets of less than
q players. Recently the threshold quantum schemes have
been extended to intermediate, or ramp schemes [6], in
which there are subsets of players that may recover par-
tial information about the secret and which collectively
form the intermediate structure. Ramp schemes trade se-
curity for efficiency: they allow the sharing of quantum
secrets of a dimension larger than the dimension of the
players’ shares, which, as we explain later, is impossible
in threshold schemes.
An important desideratum in the theory of quantum
(as well as classical) secret sharing is the construction
of good protocols, and a vast amount of work is dedi-
cated to this subject [7–11]. A promising approach is the
using quantum error correcting codes for the construc-
tion of quantum secret sharing protocols: recovering a
quantum secret is equivalent to the ability to detect and
correct errors. One of the simplest examples of such du-
ality between error correcting codes and secret sharing is
∗ vgheorgh@ucalgary.ca
the [[5, 1, 3]]2 qubit code that induces a (3, 5) threshold
quantum secret sharing scheme [5].
Given some quantum error correcting code, a funda-
mental problem is to determine the induced access, for-
bidden and intermediate structures, and to quantify the
information available in intermediate subsets. The vast
majority of literature approaches this problem from a
state point of view: consider an arbitrary quantum state
|ψ〉 on the input state, then investigate the reduced den-
sity matrix of the encoded state down to some subset S
of the carriers. If the reduced density matrix is indepen-
dent of the input state, then S belongs to the forbidden
structure, whereas if the density matrix is isometrically
equivalent to |ψ〉〈ψ| then S belongs to the access struc-
ture. The intermediate structure consists of subsets that
do not satisfy the previous two conditions.
Although the above approach works, it is in general
tedious. Since the input state (secret) consists of k qu-
dits, the number of coefficients used to describe it scale
exponentially with k, and even numerical methods be-
come inefficient for quantum codes with large k. In our
present work, we employ a completely different approach
based on a channel point of view, and regard the error
correcting code as an isometric encoding of k qudits into
n carriers, as shown schematically in Fig. 1. If the chan-
nel from the input of the isometry to some subset S of
carriers is perfect (up to a unitary or isometry) then S
belongs to the access structure, and if it is totally noisy
then S belongs to the forbidden structure, with the inter-
mediate case in between. For the class of qudit stabilizer
codes, which include the vast majority of known error
correcting codes, we showed [12] that any such channel
can be fully characterized by what we called an informa-
tion group, a subgroup of the Pauli group of k qudits.
The symplectic structure of the information group fully
characterizes the capacity of the channel and it can be
shown that the latter can perfectly transmit an integer
ar
X
iv
:1
20
4.
10
72
v3
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
5 M
ay
 20
12
2. 
. 
. V 
. 
. 
1 
2 
k 
1 
2 
n 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. ¯S
|ψ￿
Dealer 
Players 
Stabilizer encoding 
S
ρs
Quantum channel 
FIG. 1. Quantum secret sharing scheme induced by a stabi-
lizer code, where V denotes the encoding isometry.
number of r qudits plus an additional integer number s
of classical “dits”, with r+ s 6 k. This allows us to pre-
cisely quantify the amount of accessible information by
an intermediate set. Furthermore, determining whether
the channel is perfect or not is a polynomial time (in k)
decision problem, and this allows us to determine if S
belongs the access structure efficiently. Having the ac-
cess structure determined, we show that the forbidden
and intermediate structures are fully determined by the
former.
We next show how to improve the security of general-
ized secret sharing schemes and transform them to per-
fect semi-quantum schemes, i.e. how to effectively “re-
move” the intermediate structure while keeping the ac-
cess structure the same. Our method is based on twirling
what we call the intermediate information group, a sub-
group of the Pauli group of k qudits associated with the
intermediate structure. The symplectic structure of this
group provides a systematic method of erasing the inter-
mediate structure by allowing the dealer to send classical
information to the players using an appropriate classical
secret sharing scheme. We show that our scheme is op-
timal in the amount of classical bits the dealer has to
distribute.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
Sec. II we define the generalized Pauli group and qudit
stabilizer codes. We then show in Sec. III how any ar-
bitrary stabilizer quantum error correcting code induces
a generalized secret sharing scheme, and prove that the
access structure of the latter fully determines the forbid-
den and intermediate structures. In Sec. IV we introduce
the subset information group, show that it fully charac-
terizes the amount of information accessible by a sub-
set, then present an algorithm for determining the access
structure. The method of transforming an arbitrary gen-
eralized secret sharing scheme into a perfect scheme by
allowing the sharing of extra classical bits between the
dealer and the players is the subject of Sec. V. Finally,
we present simple illustrative examples in Sec. VI and
conclusions and open questions in Sec. VII.
II. PRELIMINARY REMARKS AND
DEFINITIONS
A. Generalized Pauli operators and graph codes
We generalize Pauli operators to higher dimensional
systems of prime dimension D following [13–15]. The X
and Z operators acting on a single qudit are defined as
Z =
D−1∑
j=0
ωj |j〉 〈j| , X =
D−1∑
j=0
|j〉 〈j + 1| , (1)
and satisfy
XD = ZD = I, XZ = ωZX, ω = e2pii/D, (2)
where the addition of integers is modulo D, as will be
assumed from now on. For a collection of n qudits1 we use
subscripts to identify the corresponding Pauli operators:
thus Zi and Xi operate on the space of qudit i. The
Hilbert space of a single qudit is denoted by H, and the
Hilbert space of n qudits by Hn, respectively. Operators
of the form
ωλX~xZ~z := ωλXx11 Z
z1
1 ⊗Xx22 Zz22 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xxnn Zznn (3)
will be referred to as Pauli products, where λ is an integer
in ZD and ~x and ~z are n-tuples in ZnD, the additive group
of n-tuple integers mod D. For a fixed n the collection
of all possible Pauli products (3) form a group under
operator multiplication, the Pauli group Pn. If p is a
Pauli product, then pD = I is the identity operator on
Hn, and hence the order of any element of Pn is D. While
Pn is not Abelian, it has the property that two elements
commute up to a phase
p1p2 = ω
λ12p2p1, (4)
with λ12 an integer in ZD that depends on p1 and p2.
The collection of Pauli products with λ = 0, i.e. a
pre-factor of 1, is denoted by Qn. The elements X~xZ~z
of Qn form an orthonormal basis of L(Hn), the Hilbert
space of linear operators on Hn, with respect to the inner
product
1
Dn
Tr[(X~x1Z~z1)†X~x2Z~z2 ] = δ~x1,~x2δ~z1,~z2 ,
∀X~x1Z~z1 , X~x2Z~z2 ∈ Qn. (5)
Note that Qn is a projective group or group up to phases.
There is a bijective map between Qn and the quotient
group Pn/{ωλI} for λ ∈ ZD where {ωλI}, the center of
Pn, consists of phases multiplying the identity operator
on n qudits. The projective group Qn is also isomor-
phic to the additive group Z2nD of 2n-tuple integers under
addition mod D.
1 or k, depending on the context; for the latter case one should
replace n by k in all definitions of this subsection.
3B. Qudit stabilizer codes
Relative to the Pauli group Pn of n carrier qudits we
define a stabilizer code HC to be a K ≥ 1-dimensional
subspace of the carriers’ Hilbert space Hn, HC ⊂ Hn,
satisfying three conditions:
C1: There is a subgroup S of Pn such that for every s
in S and every |ψ〉 in C
s|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 (6)
C2: The subgroup S is maximal in the sense that every
s in Pn for which (6) is satisfied for all |ψ〉 ∈ HC
belongs to S.
C3: The coding space HC is maximal in the sense that
any ket |ψ〉 that satisfies (6) for every s ∈ S lies in
HC .
If these conditions are fulfilled we call S the stabilizer
of the code HC . That it is Abelian follows from the
commutation relation (4), since for K > 0 there is some
nonzero |ψ〉 satisfying (6).
Note that one can always find a subgroup S of Pn
satisfying C1 and C2 for any subspace HC of the Hilbert
space, but it might consist of nothing but the identity.
Thus it is condition C3 that distinguishes stabilizer codes
from nonadditive codes. A stabilizer code is uniquely
determined by S as well as by HC , since S determines
HC through C3, so in a sense the code and its stabilizer
are dual to each other.
A qudit stabilizer code is usually denoted by [[n, k, δ]]D
where n represents the number of carrier qudits (each of
dimension D, assumed in this article a prime number)
and k specifies the number of input (or encoded) qudits,
assumed to have the same dimensionality D as the car-
rier qudits2. Here δ is the distance of the code [17], a
parameter that essentially specifies how “good” the code
is: best codes have as large as possible distance with as
few as possible carriers. The stabilizer code can then be
seen as arising from the isometric encoding of the input
space Hk into the K = Dk dimensional subspace HC of
Hn by the isometry
V : Hk −→ HC ⊂ Hn, V =
K−1∑
j=0
|cj〉 〈j| . (7)
Here {|j〉} is an orthonormal basis of the input space Hk
and the coding space is specified by HC = Span{|cj〉},
where the codewords |cj〉’s are all orthogonal. Note that
V cannot be any isometric encoding of Hk into HC , but
one compatible with the stabilizer requirements C1–C3
above.
2 See [16] for a general treatment of stabilizer codes with qudits
of composite dimensionality, where some differences arise. For
example, the input qudits do not have to have the same dimen-
sionality D as the carriers, but can be of any dimension d that
divides D.
III. GENERALIZED SECRET SHARING
SCHEMES
A. Access, forbidden and intermediate structures
We now show that any quantum error correcting code
can be turned into a generalized secret sharing scheme as
follows. Let |ψ〉 ∈ Hk be an arbitrary k qudit quantum
state, (secret, unknown by the n output qudits), which
is then “distributed” to the n carrier qudits (players) via
the corresponding stabilizer encoding V , so the n players
end up sharing the encoded state V |ψ〉 ∈ HC ⊂ Hn. Let
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of output qudits, and
let N be the collection of all subsets of N , i.e. the power
set of N . We define the following structures:
• A – the access structure (or the authorized struc-
ture): A ⊂ N such that any subset of qudits S ∈ A
can fully recover |ψ〉, i.e. the quantum channel from
the input of the isometry V to any subset in S ∈ A
is perfect.
• F – the forbidden structure (or the un-authorized
structure): F ⊂ N such that no subset of qudits
S ∈ F can recover anything about |ψ〉, i.e. the
quantum channel from the input of the isometry V
to any subset in S ∈ F is completely noisy.
• I – the intermediate structure (or the ramp struc-
ture): I ⊂ N such that any subset of qudits S ∈ I
can recover some partial information about |ψ〉, i.e.
the quantum channel from the input of the isome-
try V to any subset in S ∈ A is noisy (not perfect
nor completely noisy).
In conclusion, the isometry V completely determines the
triplet (A,F , I), and we call the latter a generalized se-
cret sharing scheme. Whenever I = {∅} we call the
scheme perfect. Our definition generalizes the two most
common secret sharing schemes in the literature:
1. the threshold (q, n) secret sharing scheme, in which
any subset of q or more players can fully recover
the quantum secret (are authorized), whereas any
subset of less than q players cannot recover any
information whatsoever about the secret (are for-
bidden). Formally,
A = {S ∈ N : |S| > q} ,
F = {S ∈ N : |S| < q} ,
I = {∅}, (8)
where |S| denotes the size of the set S, i.e. the
number of players in S. The threshold schemes
are a strict subset of the perfect schemes, since the
latter allow for access structures with subsets of
different sizes;
2. the ramp (q, L, n) secret sharing scheme, in which
any subset of q or more players is authorized, any
4subset of q − L or fewer is forbidden, and those
with q − u(0 < u < L) are not all authorized nor
all forbidden. In this notation a threshold secret
sharing scheme has L = 1. In our notation, a ramp
(q, L, n) scheme must have
A ⊇ {S ∈ N : |S| > q} ,
F ⊇ {S ∈ N : |S| 6 q − L} ,
I ⊆ {S ∈ N : q − L < |S| < q}. (9)
Note that any [[n, k, δ]]D stabilizer code can be turned
into a (q, L, n) ramp secret sharing scheme, with q =
n − δ + 1 and L = n − 2δ + 2, since any subset of more
than n− δ players has full information about the secret
and can fully recover the secret by a suitable decoding
procedure, hence it is an authorized set and belongs to
the access structure, whereas any subset of less than δ
players has no information whatsoever about the secret,
hence it is a forbidden set and belongs to the adversary
structure; see Sec. III.A of [18] for a simple no-cloning
based argument. One therefore has a ramp (n − δ +
1, n− 2δ + 2, n) quantum secret sharing scheme.
We now illustrate the concepts of this section by simple
examples. First, consider the [[5, 1, 3]]2 code [19, 20]. It
can be shown that all subsets of size 3 or more can fully
recover whatever information was encoded, whereas any
subset of size 2 or less cannot recover anything. Therefore
this code can be turned into a (q = 3, n = 5) threshold
secret sharing scheme.
Next, consider the [[7, 1, 3]]2 additive graph code of
[12], which is locally unitarily equivalent to the Steane
code [21]. It then follows that all subsets of size 5 or
more can recover what was encoded, whereas any subset
of size 2 or less cannot recover anything. However, there
is more to say about this code, and one can show that the
subsets of size 3 or 4 can either fully recover the secret or
cannot recover anything, hence I = {∅}, so the scheme is
perfect (although not threshold). See the discussion on
pg. 10 of [12] for a detailed discussion and for a full list
of subsets comprising A and F .
Finally, consider the [[4, 2, 2]]2 code [22] that can cor-
rect one erasure error, i.e. can fully correct one qubit
error provided one knows what the corrupted qubit is. It
can be shown [12] that all subsets of size 3 or 4 can re-
cover all encoded information, whereas any subset of size
1 cannot recover anything. All subsets of size 2 can only
recover partial information (are not able to fully recon-
struct what was encoded). We can therefore turn this
code into a (q = 3, L = 2, n = 4) ramp secret sharing
scheme. Using our formalism, A = {S ∈ N : |S| > 3},
F = {S ∈ N : |S| 6 1} and I = {S ∈ N : |S| = 2}.
B. Relations between A, F and I
The following question arrises naturally: given an arbi-
trary stabilizer code, how can one determine the induced
triplet (A,F , I)? This question is of crucial importance
in the theory of quantum secret sharing, and, before pro-
viding a full answer to this question, we first explain why
the access structure A completely determines the forbid-
den structure F (and viceversa), and together they de-
termine the intermediate structure I, so it is enough to
know onlyA (or F) to determine the full triplet (A,F , I).
The fact that A is dual to F was already known [4, 5],
but we restate the result for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 1. Let (A,F , I) be a generalized quantum se-
cret sharing scheme induced by some quantum error cor-
recting code. Then A and F are dual to each other, and
completely determine I, in the sense
A = {S ∈ N : S¯ ∈ F} , (10)
F = {S ∈ N : S¯ ∈ A} , (11)
I = N \
{
A
⋃
F
}
, (12)
where S¯ = N \ S denotes the complement of S.
Proof. The argument is based on two facts: i) a perfect
quantum channel cannot “leak” information, since other-
wise the no-cloning theorem is violated; and ii), an isom-
etry “conserves” information: if it is absent from some
part of its output it has to be present in the complement.
Consider first a subset S ∈ A. Then the players in
S can recover full information about what was encoded,
and, by the “No Splitting” Theorem of [23], this implies
that the complement S¯ cannot contain any information
whatsoever about the input, hence must belong to the
forbidden structure F . Intuitively, if S belong to the ac-
cess structure, then the quantum channel from the input
of the underlying isometry V to S (obtained by partially-
tracing down S¯) must be perfect, so the complementary
channel to S¯ must be completely noisy (otherwise the
no-cloning theorem will be violated), which is the same
as saying that S¯ ∈ F .
On the other hand, let’s now consider a subset S ∈ F .
Then, absolutely no information about what was encoded
can be recovered from S, and, by the “Somewhere The-
orem” of [23], all information about the input must be
present in S, hence S ∈ A. Intuitively, this is the same
as saying that an isometry “conserves” information: if it
is absent from a subset it must be present in its comple-
ment. This proves the duality (10)–(11) between A and
F .
Finally, (12) follows at once by construction.
We therefore conclude this section by restating that it
is enough to determine A (or F) in order to fully deter-
mine (A,F , I). In the next section we provide a system-
atic way of determining A.
IV. DETERMINING (A,F , I)
We now review some essential results about informa-
tion location in subsets of players of a quantum secret
5sharing scheme induced by an [[n, k, δ]]D stabilizer code.
The interested reader can consult our previous work [12]
for detailed proofs of the claims of this section3.
A. The subset information group and the access
structure
Let us consider a subset S ∈ N of players, and let S¯ de-
note its complement. The relevant question for quantum
secret sharing is how much information can S recover
about a previously encoded secret |ψ〉 ∈ Hk? Whatever
information S can extract about the secret is fully deter-
mined by the reduced density matrix
ρS := TrS¯ [V |ψ〉〈ψ|V †]. (13)
Since the collection Qk of Pauli operators on the input
space Hk forms an operator basis of the dealer’s operator
Hilbert space L(Hk), one can expand the secret as
|ψ〉〈ψ| = 1
Dk
∑
~x,~z∈ZkD
c(~x, ~z)X~xZ~z, (14)
where
c(~x, ~z) = Tr
[
(X~xZ~z)†|ψ〉〈ψ|] = 〈ψ|(X~xZ~z)†|ψ〉 (15)
are the Fourier coefficients of the expansion.
The state of S is then
ρS =
∑
~x,~z∈ZkD
c(~x, ~z)TrS¯
[
V X~xZ~zV †
]
. (16)
We shown in [12] that the collection of operators X~xZ~z
on the dealer’s space Hk for which TrS¯
[
V X~xZ~zV †
] 6= 0
forms a group G(S), called the subset information group.
We have also proved that the subset information group
fully characterizes what kind of correlations are present
between the dealer and the subset S of the players,
and provided an efficient linear algebra based algorithm
for finding it. More specifically, if X~xZ~z ∈ G(S), i.e.
TrS¯
[
V X~xZ~zV †
] 6= 0, then any two eigenvectors |φ1〉 and
|φ2〉 of X~xZ~z remain fully distinguishable on the subset
S after the encoding by V , i.e. have orthogonal support
so their Hilbert-Schmidt inner product is zero
Tr
[(
TrS¯ [V |φ1〉〈φ1|V †]
)†
TrS¯ [V |φ2〉〈φ2|V †]
]
= 0. (17)
In other words, if X~xZ~z ∈ G(S), the correlations between
the players in S and the dealer are perfect in the eigen-
basis of X~xZ~z, that is, if the dealer chooses the secret to
3 All results in were proven for additive graph codes (a subset of
stabilizer codes, see e.g. [24] for a comprehensive introduction),
but we noted that all our results are automatically valid for prime
dimensional stabilizer codes, since the latter are locally unitary
equivalent to the former, as proved by Schlingemann in [25].
be one of the the eigenvectors of X~xZ~z, say |φj〉, then
the players in S can fully recover the j by performing an
appropriate positive operator-valued measure (POVM).
We say that the X~xZ~z type of information[23] is per-
fectly present in S. We also proved that the C∗-algebra
generated by the elements of G(S) is fully correctable[26–
28] on S, that is, any 2 orthogonal states in the algebra
remain orthogonal after encoding and tracing down to S.
The subset S contains no information whatsoever
about the secret |ψ〉〈ψ| if and only if the subset informa-
tion group is proportional to identity on Hk, G(S) ∝ I,
or, equivalently, all encoded operators V X~xZ~zV † trace to
zero down to S with the exception of V X
~0Z
~0V † = V V †.
That is, no matter what measurement strategy the play-
ers in S adopt, they cannot recover any information
about the secret |ψ〉〈ψ|, or, equivalently, the reduced den-
sity matrix ρS is independent of |ψ〉〈ψ|,
ρS =
1
Dk
TrS¯
[
V V †
]
. (18)
The subset S contains all information about the secret
if and only if the subset information group is the whole
Pauli group Pk, G(S) = Pk, hence we have the following
Theorem.
Theorem 2. Let (A,F , I) be a generalized quantum se-
cret sharing scheme induced by an [[n, k, δ]]D quantum
error correcting code. Then the access structure A is
given by
A = {S ∈ N : G(S) = Pk} . (19)
Proof. See Theorem 4 (iii) of [12] for a rigorous proof.
To determine whether G(S) = Pk for some subset S
reduces to checking whether the partial trace down to S¯
of the 2k encoded generators of Pk is not zero. This is
because if some encoded generator traces down to zero
on S, then, by the group property, G(S) must be a strict
subset of Pk (removing an independent generator makes
the generated group strictly smaller). The question “Is
G(S) = Pk?” is a decision problem, and its yes/no answer
can be provided via solving a system of linear equations
over ZD, see Appendix C of [12] for a detailed efficient
algorithm (with polynomial running time in n and k).
Note that one can also use the Choi-Jamio lkowski iso-
morphism in determining if a subset S belongs to the
access structure as follows. Consider a maximally entan-
gled state |Ψ+〉 between the input of the isometry and
some reference system R. Let
Ω = (IR ⊗ V )|Ψ+〉 (20)
and let
ρRS = TrS¯ |Ω〉〈Ω|. (21)
Then S ∈ A if and only if ρRS is a pure maximally entan-
gled state, since the latter implies that the channel from
the input of V to S is perfect. However, our approach
is more powerful since it characterizes the information
present in intermediate subsets, as described in the next
subsection.
6B. The structure of the subset information group
and the information available in an intermediate
subset
Let g1, g2, . . . , gm be a minimal generating set
4 of G(S),
G(S) = 〈g1, g2, . . . , gm〉. (22)
Since G(S) is a subgroup of the Pauli group of k qudits
each of prime dimension, it is Clifford equivalent to a
simpler group G0(S), the canonical subset information
group, generated only by “local” X and Z operators,
G0(S) ≡WG(S)W †
= 〈X1, Z1, . . . , Xr, Zr, Zr+1, . . . , Zr+s〉 (23)
= Gsym0 (S)
⋃
Giso0 (S), with 2r + s 6 2k, (24)
where W is a Clifford operator5 that depends on the sub-
set S, but for simplicity of notation we remove this de-
pendence. Here
Gsym0 (S) = 〈X1, Z1, . . . , Xr, Zr〉 (25)
is the symplectic subgroup of G0(S) and
Giso0 (S) = 〈Zr+1, . . . , Zr+s〉 (26)
is the isotropic subgroup of G0(S).
The fact that G(S) is isomorphic to G0(S) in (23) is a
direct consequence of a more general result regarding the
structure of bilinear symplectic forms, see Theorem 1.1
of [29]. Sec. IV.B of [30] provides an explicit algorithm
for constructing the Clifford operator W as a product
of elementary qudit Clifford gates; the qudit algorithm
is just a straightforward generalization of the qubit one
presented in Sec. 1 of [31].
The form of G0(S) combined with the remarks of the
previous subsection that the C∗-algebra generated by
G0(S) is fully correctable allows us to say that the quan-
tum channel from the input of the isometry to the subset
S, obtained by partially-tracing over S¯, is a perfect r-
qudit channel (corresponds to the symplectic subgroup
Gsym0 (S)) tensored with a perfect s dit classical channel
(corresponds to the isotropic subgroup Giso0 (S) and its
quantum capacity is zero, since its correctable algebra
is commutative). In other words, the channel can per-
fectly transmit r qudits plus extra s classical dits, which
is equivalent, in the context of secret sharing, to the fact
that the players in S can fully recover r qudits of the
secret together with at most s “extra” classical dits of
information by performing an appropriate decoding pro-
cedure.
4 That is, removing any generator results in generating a strictly
smaller group.
5 A Clifford operator in a unitary operator that maps Pauli oper-
ators to Pauli operators through conjugation, that is, leaves the
Pauli group invariant under conjugation.
V. CONCEALING THE INTERMEDIATE
STRUCTURE VIA TWIRLING
Consider now a generalized secret sharing scheme in
which there are no intermediate structures, i.e. I = {∅}.
In this case it can be shown [4] that the dimension of
the quantum secret cannot exceed the dimension of each
individual player’s quantum system, or, equivalently,
that [[n, k, δ]]D codes induce generalized secret sharing
schemes that must have I 6= {∅} whenever k > 1. The
argument is based on the fact that there exist forbidden
subsets that can be made authorized by the addition of
only one additional player, hence complete information
about the secret is transferred via a single player’s quan-
tum system, from which the bound follows. Therefore,
threshold quantum secret sharing schemes are extremely
inefficient in terms of the required quantum communica-
tion. For example, if the dealer wants to share a 1, 000
qubit secret to 1, 000 players, then each player has to
posses at least a 1, 000 qubit quantum system, for a total
of 1, 000× 1, 000 = 1, 000, 000 carrier qudits!
However, ramp schemes do not have this strong lim-
itation: security is traded for efficiency, so that play-
ers belonging to the intermediate structure can extract
some partial information about the secret, with the ben-
efit that the encoded quantum secret can have larger di-
mension than the players’ individual share size.
Are there ways to improve the security of such inter-
mediate secret sharing schemes, for example, by reduc-
ing the amount of information the intermediate struc-
ture can extract about the quantum secret? As recently
shown in [11] such methods exist and are based on com-
bining the ramp quantum secret sharing scheme with a
classical secret sharing scheme. In the simplest scenar-
ion, the dealer prepares a k-qudit secret, then for every
input qudit i chooses with equal probability 1/D two in-
tegers mi, ni ∈ ZD, then applies the operator Xmii Znii ;
the dealer effectively encrypts the quantum secret using
a 2k classical key, then distributes the “scrambled” se-
cret to the players using the stabilizer encoding. From
the players point of view, who do not know the integers
mi and ni, this is equivalent to the application by the
dealer of a completely depolarizing, or “twirling”, chan-
nel to each input qudit. After this the dealer distributes
the 2k dit classical key to the n players using a classical
threshold secret sharing scheme (q, n), with q appropri-
ately chosen, so that any subset of q or more players can
recover the classical key, which allows them to “undo” the
effect of the depolarizing channel and recover the whole
quantum secret, whereas any subset of less than q play-
ers has no information whatsoever about the classical key
and their shared quantum state is independent of the se-
cret. In this way, a generalized secret sharing scheme
induced by an [[n, k, δ]]D stabilizer code is transformed
to a threshold secret sharing scheme (q, n). This method
is very similar to teleportation, in which Bob cannot re-
cover Alice’s state without knowing the results of Alice’s
measurements (that play the role of the twirling channel).
7This motivates the following question: given the in-
termediate structure I, what is the most efficient way
of “erasing” the information from it, i.e. what is the
minimum length of the classical random encryption key
the dealer must use and how can this be done system-
atically, for arbitrary generalized secret sharing schemes
(induced by stabilizer quantum error correcting codes)?
We present below such a systematic method and show
that the dealer can in general use classical encryption
keys of smaller length l, with k 6 l 6 2k, and that the
length of the encryption key depends solely on the un-
derlying stabilizer code. We will further show that our
scheme is optimal in the length of the encryption key,
that is, one cannot use shorter keys. This minimizes the
amount of classical communication between the dealer
and the players.
A. Hiding information from a subset
The whole idea behind our scheme is to employ the
structure of the subset information group G0(S). Con-
sider a generator of G0(S). Without loss of generality, we
choose X1. Then, as mentioned before, the players in S
can recover the X1-type of information about the secret
by an appropriate POVM. Suppose now that before the
encoding the dealer applies with probability pj = 1/D
the operator Zj1 , where 0 ≤ j < D. One can easily check
that
1
D
D−1∑
j=0
Zj1X1Z
j
1
†
=
1
D
D−1∑
j=0
ωjX1 = 0. (27)
Then, the X1-type of information is hidden from the sub-
set S, since, effectively, the players in S do not know
which j the dealer chose, and, by (27), the terms of the
form TrS¯
[
V˜ X1V˜
†
]
in the expansion (16) of ρS become
now
TrS¯
V˜
 1
D
D−1∑
j=0
Zj1X1Z
j
1
†
 V˜ †
 = 0, (28)
where V˜ = VW (we remind the reader that G0(S) was
obtained from G(S) via a conjugation by the Clifford op-
erator W and this is why V is replaced by V˜ in (28)).
Also, any other operator in the information group that
contains X1 gets mapped to zero (a direct consequence of
(27)), so at the end all non-zero terms in the expansion
of ρS that contain the X1 generator become zero.
It is now clear how the dealer can hide all informa-
tion about the secret from the players in S: twirls each
generator of the canonical subset information group by a
corresponding non-commuting operator (either X or Z).
Since any operator in the information group is a prod-
uct of the generators, it follows at once that it will get
mapped to zero by the twirling procedure, with the ex-
ception of the identity. Therefore, if before twirling the
quantum secret was represented in S by a state of the
form (16), after the twirling procedure the state down
to S has the form (18), i.e. the players in S lack any
information whatsoever about the secret.
Note that if the players know which operators the
dealer applied to perform the twirling, they can recover
the same information about the secret as before the
twirling, since the twirling unitary on the dealer’s space
is effectively just a change of basis now known by the
players.
B. Perfect semi-quantum secret sharing schemes
Consider now the collection of intermediate subsets I.
To hide the information from I we can define the “in-
termediate information group” or the “ramp information
group” as a union of all intermediate subset information
groups
G(I) :=
⋃
S∈I
G(S), (29)
which again is a subgroup of the Pauli group Pk. Next
employ the same arguments as in the previous subsection,
but now with G(I) replacing G(S) (and G0(I) denoting
the canonical intermediate information group obtained
from G(S) through an appropriate Clifford conjugation).
The dealer distributes the randomly generated classical
key to the players using a perfect classical secret shar-
ing scheme (A′,F ′, I ′), having A′ = A, F ′ = F ⋃ I and
I ′ = {∅}, so that the players in I have no information
whatsoever about the key but players in A can fully re-
cover the key. In this way, the information is concealed
from I. Note that classical secret sharing schemes with
arbitrary access structure exist [32] as long as the access
structure is monotone –i.e., if a set S can recover the
secret, so can all sets containing S. In conclusion, us-
ing our scheme one can transform an arbitrary (A,F , I)
ramp scheme into a perfect scheme (A,F ⋃ I, {∅}) with
the same access structure but without any intermediate
subsets! See Fig. 2 for a graphical description of our
protocol.
In particular, if we define q to be the minimum inte-
ger so that all subsets of players of size q or more be-
long to A (and therefore the subsets in I must be of
smaller size), then we can employ a classical (q, n) thresh-
old secret sharing scheme to distribute the classical key
to the n players so that all subsets in A of size q or more
can fully recover the key, hence the full quantum secret,
whereas the players in I have no information whatso-
ever about the classical key and cannot recover anything
about the original quantum secret. In this way, a gener-
alized (A,F , I) quantum secret sharing scheme induced
by an [[n, k, δ]]D stabilizer quantum error correcting code
can be turned into a threshold (q = n − δ + 1, n) semi-
quantum secret sharing scheme by allowing the sharing
of 2r + s 6 2k classical bits between the dealer and the
players.
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FIG. 2. Turning a ramp quantum secret sharing scheme into
a perfect semi-quantum secret sharing scheme. Note that r+
s = k, as shown by Lemma 1.
The twirling followed by the encoding of the classi-
cal key into a perfect classical secret sharing scheme can
be seen as effectively “cutting” the ramp structure and
transforming it to an un-authorized structure. Mathe-
matically, the intermediate information group G0(I) is
being “twirled” to the identity operator, i.e.∑
U
UgU† = 0, ∀g ∈ G0(I), g 6= I, (30)
where the sum is taken over all unitary operators U of
the form Xmii Z
ni
i Z
mr+j
r+j , 1 6 i 6 r, 1 6 j 6 s and
mi, ni,mr+j run over all possible integers in ZD, so the
number of terms in (30) is
Dr ×Dr ×Ds = D2r+s 6 D2k. (31)
Compactly we write∑
U
UG0(I)U† = I. (32)
We call the collection of all D2rDs such unitary oper-
ators the twirling group (it is easy to see that the col-
lection of such operators form a group), and denote it
by T0(I). Note that the structure of the twirling group
is easy to read from the structure of G0(I), namely, if
G0(I) = 〈X1, Z1, . . . , Xr, Zr, Zr+1, . . . , Zr+s〉, then the
twirling group T0(I) is generated by
T0(I) = 〈X1, Z1, . . . , Xr, Zr, Xr+1, . . . , Xr+s〉. (33)
We can show that r + s = k, which implies that the
length l = 2r + s of the classical encryption key is in
general smaller than 2k, but is bounded below by k, the
lower bound being achieved whenever r = 0. This is the
case whenever the information group G(I) is Abelian,
which means that before the twirling the intermediate
subsets were able to extract only classical information
about the secret. Our result is summarized by the fol-
lowing Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let G(I) be the intermediate in-
formation group obtained from an [[n, k, δ]]D
stabilizer quantum error correcting code. Let
G0(I) = 〈X1, Z1, . . . , Xr, Zr, Zr+1, . . . , Zr+s〉 be the
canonical intermediate information group isomorphic to
G(I). Then
r + s = k. (34)
Proof. We prove the Lemma by contradiction. Assume
r + s < k. Split the input qudits into 2 subsets, I1 and
I2, with I1 consisting of the first r + s qudits and with
I2 consisting of the last k − (r + s) qudits. Choose R to
be some subset that belongs to the ramp structure.
We first show that the complement R¯ of R must also
belong to the ramp structure. There are 3 possible cases
for R¯ to belong to : i) the un-authorized structure; ii) the
access structure; iii) the ramp structure;. Case i) must
be excluded, since it implies (see the “Somewhere Theo-
rem” of [23]) that the complement R of R¯ must belong
to the access structure, which contradicts the hypothesis
that R belongs to the ramp structure. Also case ii) must
be excluded, since it implies (see the “No Splitting The-
orem” of [23]) that the complement R of R¯ must belong
to the un-authorized structure, which again contradicts
the hypothesis that R belongs to the ramp structure. We
therefore conclude that case iii) is the only possible one,
i.e. R¯ must belong to the ramp structure.
Let us return now to the collection I2. The structure of
G0(I) implies that no information about I2 is present in
any subset that belongs to the ramp structure. Denote
by R such a subset. Then, by the “Somewhere Theo-
rem” of [23], all information about I2 must be present in
the complement R¯ of R. But we just proved above that
the complement of R must belong to the ramp structure,
hence R¯ can extract partial information about I2, a con-
tradiction. Hence the initial hypothesis r + s < k must
be false. But r + s cannot be greater than k, therefore
r + s = k.
VI. EXAMPLES
A. The CNOT scheme
The simplest example that illustrates our point is a
quantum [[2, 1, 1]]2 code arising from a CNOT-type isom-
etry, illustrated Fig. 3. Although the code has distance
1 and is not really useful for quantum error correction,
it illustrates the basic principles of our work in a very
simple and intuitive manner. The codewords are
|c0〉 = CNOT(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉) = |00〉
|c1〉 = CNOT(|1〉 ⊗ |0〉) = |11〉. (35)
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FIG. 3. A CNOT-based encoding
It is clear that if both S and S¯ come together they can
reconstruct any secret that was encoded by the dealer
(they simply “undo” the effect of CNOT by applying
it again). However, any individual player (consider just
S, since by symmetry the situation is similar for S¯) has
some partial information about the secret. The subset
information group in this case is generated by
G0(S) = G0(S¯) = G(S) = G(S¯) = 〈Z〉, (36)
so the player S (or S¯) can only extract Z-information
about the secret. This is easy to verify, since the eigen-
vectors of the Z operator, |0〉 and |1〉, are encoded into
|00〉 and |11〉, respectively, and the individual players can
distinguish with certainty whether |0〉 or |1〉 was fed in
at the input. On the other hand, the X-type of informa-
tion is totally absent from both S and S¯, and this can
easily be seen by noting that |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 and
|−〉 = (|0〉− |1〉)/√2 are encoded into 2 Bell states which
are locally indistinguishable. The Y -type of information
is also locally absent, by the same argument. Therefore
we have
A = {{1, 2}} , (37)
F = {∅},
I = {{1}, {2}}.
To hide the partial information from the ramp struc-
ture, the dealer randomly generates an integer m and
then applies the operator Xm before encoding (note that
it is essential that X does not commute with the gener-
ator Z of the information group ); the twirling group is
generated by 〈X〉. The dealer then distributes the bit m
to the 2 players using a classical (2, 2) threshold secret
sharing scheme, see Fig. 4 for a graphical description.
No individual player can recover m (the classical key),
hence cannot recover any information about the secret. If
the two players collaborate they can then recoverm, undo
the effect of the twirling, then fully recover the quan-
tum secret. Therefore this code is turned into an opti-
mal (2, 2) semi-quantum threshold secret sharing scheme.
Note that the number of classical bits required is half
compared to the scheme in which the input is fully depo-
larized by a twirling group 〈X,Z〉. The length of the clas-
sical key is actually achieving the lower bound l = k = 1.
This example is extremely simple but illustrates our
main concepts, and the interested reader can easily work
out the details.
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B. The n-partite GHZ scheme
We consider now a generalization of the CNOT en-
coding. The underlying structure is a stabilizer code
[[n, 1, 1]]2 with 2 codewords,
|c0〉 = |00 · · · 0〉
|c1〉 = |11 · · · 1〉, (38)
and the encoding circuit can be realized as a “cascade”
of CNOT gates, see Fig. 5. This code has still distance
1, but nevertheless can correct for bit-flip errors using a
majority-voting based decoding. The entire collection of
n players can fully reconstruct the secret, whereas any
subset of less than n players belongs to the ramp struc-
ture and can only recover Z-information about the secret.
More technically,
G0(S) = G(S) = 〈Z〉, ∀S with |S| < n, (39)
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hence
A = {{1, . . . , n}} , (40)
F = {∅},
I = {S ∈ N : |S| < n} .
The ramp structure can be “cut” by a twirling with Xm
on the input (so the twirling group is generated again
by 〈X〉), followed by the encoding of the bit m into an
(n, n) classical threshold secret sharing scheme. There-
fore we end up with an (n, n) semi-quantum threshold
secret sharing scheme , with a classical encoding key of
length l = k = 1 (the classical communication required
is minimal and equal to the number k of input qubits).
VII. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We showed that an [[n, k, δ]]D qudit stabilizer code in-
duces a generalized secret sharing scheme consisting of
3 structures: an access structure A of which subsets of
players can fully recover the secret, a forbidden structure
F of which subsets cannot recover any information about
the secret, and an intermediate structure I of which sub-
sets can only recover partial information about the se-
cret. Using an approach based on the theory of qudit
stabilizer codes we provided a systematic way of deter-
mining the collections A, F and I. We proved that the
information available to a subset (or a collection of sub-
sets) of players can be fully described by an information
group, a subgroup of the Pauli group of k qudits, and
this quantifies the amount of accessible information in
the subset. The structure of the information group pro-
vides a natural way of “scrambling” (or “twirling”) the
quantum secret: the dealer applies a unitary operator
randomly chosen from the twirling group, completely de-
termined by the information group. The twirling group
is generated by k 6 2r + s 6 2k generators, hence the
twirling operators are indexed by 2r + s integers in ZD,
for a total number of D2r+s. The dealer can conceal the
information from the ramp structure by distributing the
2r + s-length key (that specifies which twirling operator
he applied) to the set of n players using an appropri-
ate perfect classical secret sharing scheme. In particular,
we showed that any [[n, k, δ]]D stabilizer code induces
a semi-quantum (n − δ + 1, n) threshold secret sharing
scheme. Our scheme is optimal in terms of the length
of the classical encoding key the dealer has to distribute
to the players, in contrast to the obvious scheme of 2k-
length key, in which the twirling group is the full Pauli
group of k qudits. Our method allows in general for bet-
ter perfect classical secret sharing scheme encodings of
the classical key, and therefore may drastically reduce
the total amount of classical communication.
Our scheme is extremely flexible and allows for the
construction of more general secret sharing schemes, not
just perfect ones. For example, suppose we are inter-
ested in hiding partial information only from a collection
J ⊂ I of subsets of players, not necessarily the entire
ramp structure. Then it is enough to find the group
G(I), which is constructed as the union of all subset in-
formation groups that correspond to the subsets in the
collection, then apply the same algorithm as before, but
now to G(J ) instead of G(I). We can therefore “cut”
the information about the secret from any collection of
subset of players we are interested in.
Our formalism can also be applied in entanglement
sharing schemes, in which the goal of the dealer is to
distribute entanglement to subsets of players in such a
way that any given subset is either fully entangled with
the dealer or otherwise heir joint state is separable across
the dealer/players cut. This is equivalent to the fact that
for any subset, the corresponding information group must
be either Abelian or the entire Pauli group Pk. If this is
not the case, we can again employ the notion of twirling
and classical secret sharing to transform the intermediate
subset group to an Abelian one.
A central issue we did not address in the current article
is the recovery operation. In principle, since an autho-
rized set has full information about the secret, a recov-
ery channel always exists, but its construction may not
be obvious. In this article we adopt the common strat-
egy used in the search for good quantum error correcting
codes [24], in which one is not interested in the decod-
ing but only in the parameters of the code. It would
be nice to find a clean and systematic way of explicitly
constructing this recovery operation.
In the present article we made heavy use of the sta-
bilizer structure of the encoding isometry. It would be
interesting to move beyond stabilizer encodings, or use
the formalism of approximate access structures [33], i.e.
a subset is authorized if it can recover the secret with
some bounded error. For the latter problem one should
definitely use more general encoding isometries, since the
stabilizer ones induce quantum channels with integer ca-
pacities, and this is the subject of future work.
Finally it is interesting to note that the structure of the
intermediate information group G(I) is similar to that of
non-Abelian groups used in entanglement-assisted quan-
tum error correcting codes [34], and investigating the
relations between the former and the latter may prove
fruitful.
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